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CASTING LIGHT ON THE SHADE: USING
SECURITIES LAWS TO DRAW NEW CONTOURS
IN ART INVESTMENT REGULATION
Emma Snover*
The disparate treatment of art investments under the Internal Revenue
Code and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 poses a problem. This
disparity generates inequities among art investors and between art investors
and investors in traditional securities markets. The Internal Revenue Code
considers both art and traditional securities to be capital assets with no
material distinction. For example, prior to the 2017 tax act, art investors
could defer the realization of capital gains through like-kind exchanges of
works of art under section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code. Currently,
under section 1400Z-2, an addition to the Internal Revenue Code through the
2017 tax act, art investors may defer capital gains taxes in the same manner
as traditional investors by investing their gains from the sale of works of art
into “Qualified Opportunity Funds.” These funds are utilized to spur
economic growth in designated “Opportunity Zones.”
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in contrast, does not recognize or
regulate art as an investment vehicle with a trading market. As a result of
this divergence between two legislative regimes that influence investment
decisions, inequitable and unbalanced practices can develop within the
secondary art market. Art investors may reap the tax benefits of investing in
art without being subject to any modified securities laws or regulations, such
as those concerning trading on or tipping material, nonpublic information.
This Note compares the tax treatment of art with the insider trading laws
and regulations that apply to traditional securities and explores the potential
of adapting those laws and regulations to fit the growing secondary art
market. It concludes that increased regulation of the secondary art market
would (1) synergize investing practices with the tax benefits of those
investments and (2) enhance fairness and equity in the secondary art market.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you have a sizable and impressive private art collection for
investment purposes. You are familiar with the tax implications of your art
collection, such as paying capital gains taxes when you periodically sell
works in your collection. Now, one of New York City’s top art museums has
invited you to join its board of directors. Through this position, you may
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learn which genres and artists will be most prominently featured at the
museum over the next few years.1 You may also acquire special access to
top artists and their studios.2 How might this insider knowledge impact your
investments in the secondary art market,3 recognizing that there are no
regulations regarding your use of material, nonpublic information in trading
art?
The art market has grown substantially in the twenty-first century,
reaching an estimated $67.4 billion globally in 2018.4 In that same year, the
United States represented the single largest art market, capturing 44 percent
of the global market share.5 From a tax perspective, Congress implicitly
views this sizable market as a trading market, and art itself as investment
property, because the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”) does not create
any material distinction between art and other tradable investment assets.6
Though art, as a collectible, may be subject to a different capital gains tax
rate than traditional securities,7 its classification as a capital asset and the
process of its tax assessment remain synonymous with traditional securities.8
Art transactions, for example, generate investment gains and losses just like
traditional securities.9 Despite some changes, the 2017 tax act reinforces this
perspective.10 This tax approach to art demonstrates that although art may
provide investors with incalculable personal satisfaction, art also provides
investors with satisfying opportunities for capital gains (or dissatisfying
losses) in the secondary trading market.
1. See, e.g., Hannah Furness, Art World Is “Hotbed” of Corruption, Collector Claims,
TELEGRAPH (June 2, 2016), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/02/art-world-ishotbed-of-corruption-collector-claims [https://perma.cc/3HAZ-EZRL].
2. See Robin Pogrebin, Elizabeth A. Harris & Graham Bowley, New Scrutiny of Museum
Boards Takes Aim at World of Wealth and Status, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/arts/design/whitney-art-museums-trustees.html
[https://perma.cc/B3BE-L53S].
3. This Note is concerned with transfers in the secondary art market, either at auction or
in private sales, rather than initial sales in the primary market. See infra Part I.C (defining the
primary and secondary art markets).
4. Press Release, Art Basel, The Art Market 2019: Global Art Market Reaches Its Second
Highest Level in 10 Years, Amidst Further Consolidation at the Top End (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://d2u3kfwd92fzu7.cloudfront.net/The%20Art%20Market%202019_Press%20Release2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW6R-RWE7].
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1221(a) (2018).
7. See id. § 1(h)(5)(A); see also id. § 408(m)(2)(A).
8. See id. § 1221(a); see also id. § 1222.
9. See id. § 1222; see also Estate of Elkins v. Comm’r, 767 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 2014)
(affirming the tax court’s decision to allow a fractional-ownership discount to assess the
taxable value of a decedent’s fractional interests in sixty-four works of art). Estate of Elkins
indicates the development of art as an “asset class,” rather than an asset that cannot be owned
in fractional interests. Moses Luski, Estate of Elkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
Cautionary Tale and Gem, INSIGHTS (Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, Charlotte, N.C.),
Spring 2015, at 1, 2.
10. See Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.). The 2017 tax revisions are commonly known as the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act. To remain technically accurate, this Note will refer to these revisions as the 2017
tax act. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
11 (8th ed. 2018).
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In contrast, Congress has not imputed this trading and investment
perspective of the secondary art market to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (“the Act”) or to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) more
broadly.11 The limited scope of the Act impedes the SEC’s ability to regulate
the secondary art market. Notwithstanding some important distinctions to be
discussed,12 as art transactions become more prevalent in individual
investment portfolios and the secondary art market increasingly resembles
trading in traditional securities markets,13 this discrepancy should be
addressed.
For years, there have been discussions of increasing regulations in various
corners of the art market.14 At the turn of the century, rival auction houses
Christie’s and Sotheby’s paid $512 million to settle a collusion suit15 and a
Sotheby’s executive was criminally convicted of collusion,16 flagging the art
market as an industry in need of increased regulation. More recently, Nouriel
Roubini, an economist at New York University, has emphasized that
practices within the art market would not be permitted in other financial
markets.17 Others have concurred with Roubini in considering the art market
to be an “informal economy.”18 In December 2019, the New York Times
published an opinion piece exposing the development of inequitable
practices among directors, who are often also art collectors and investors, at
American museums.19 No compelling public policy or economic reasoning
justifies the absence of regulation in this arena.
This Note explores the divergence between the tax treatment of art
transactions and the absence of any modified securities laws or regulations,
particularly those concerning insider trading, in the secondary art market. As
the mandates of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the SEC share
11. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018), with
I.R.C. §§ 1221(a), 1400Z.
12. See infra Part II.D.
13. See, e.g., Press Release, Art Basel, supra note 4.
14. See Marc Spiegler, Time To Reform the Art Market?, FORBES (May 30, 2005),
https://www.forbes.com/2005/05/30/cx_0530conn_ls.html [https://perma.cc/7BGY-SBRX]
(quoting Greg Allen, a former financier and co-chair of the Junior Associates Board at the
Museum of Modern Art, who said “people coming from the finance world into the art market
tend to be shocked by the level of opacity and murkiness”); see also John Gapper & Peter
Aspden, Davos 2015: Nouriel Roubini Says Art Market Needs Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
22, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/992dcf86-a250-11e4-aba2-00144feab7de [https://
perma.cc/RVE5-CCYK].
15. Vanessa O’Connell, Christie’s, Sotheby’s Agree to Pay $512 Million Collusion
Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2000), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB96982962
0926708015 [https://perma.cc/ZPL6-SKM5].
16. DOUG WOODHAM, ART COLLECTING TODAY: MARKET INSIGHTS FOR EVERYONE
PASSIONATE ABOUT ART 31 (2017).
17. Gapper & Aspden, supra note 14.
18. Artsy Editors, What Actually Happens in the Art Market’s Informal Economy, ARTSY
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-art-markets-informal-economy
[https://perma.cc/BQ39-VXDL].
19. Michael Massing, Opinion, How the Superrich Took over the Museum World, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/14/opinion/sunday/modern-artmuseum.html [https://perma.cc/WKL9-VU3R].
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principles of equity, efficiency, and transparency, this Note finds the
practices resulting from this divergence to be particularly alarming.20 The
current absence of regulation in the secondary art market makes it difficult
to address any specific instance of insider trading in this market. However,
this Note takes a proactive approach to resolving a regulatory deficiency in a
growing trading and investment markets, which is especially relevant as
debates about these principles ripen in public discourse in the context of the
2020 presidential election.21
Part I provides essential background information about federal income
taxation, securities law, and the art market. Part II uses this background to
critique the disparate treatment of the same asset (art) by two different federal
agencies (the IRS and the SEC). Part III unveils an integrated resolution by
discussing relevant policy considerations and recommends that Congress
look to the Code to expand the scope of the Act and subject the secondary art
market to modified insider trading regulations. This resolution posits that
increased regulation of the secondary art market best acknowledges the
market for what it is: a lucrative platform for investment, which generates a
strong trading market and is one that is best enhanced by fair and balanced
regulation, rather than compromised by its absence.
I. PAINTING THE PICTURE: TAX, SECURITIES, AND THE ART MARKET
To understand the disparate treatment of art investments under the Code
and securities laws, an overview of each of these elements is first necessary.
Part I.A introduces important tax concepts and provides a brief history of
federal income taxation. Part I.B discusses central concepts within securities
law. Part I.C defines the art market and its related terms.
A. Tax Concepts and a Brief History of Taxation
Though the background and history of taxation may seem distant from the
notion of modifying securities laws and regulations to fit the secondary art
market, tradable investment assets, like art, became a source of taxable
income under the Code.22 Understanding the Code’s treatment of art
therefore illuminates a path to inform the Act’s application to the secondary
art market.

20. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 28–30; see also What We Do, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/
J3E6-KJF8] (last updated June 10, 2013).
21. See, e.g., Scott Eastman, Unpacking Biden’s Tax Plan for Capital Gains, TAX FOUND.
(July 31, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/joe-biden-tax-proposals [https://perma.cc/J9UE59HX]; Matt Stevens, Elizabeth Warren on a Wealth Tax, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-wealth-tax.html
[https://perma.cc/NVB7-TL4S].
22. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012) (summarizing
the history of how personal property became a source of taxable income).
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1. Basic Concepts
The Code comprises the body of federal taxation statutes in the United
States. The Code has continuously evolved since its initial implementation
in 1939.23 Though the Department of the Treasury has the statutory authority
to administer and enforce the Code, Congress grants the Treasury the
authority to delegate its responsibilities.24 The Treasury has, in turn,
delegated many of these responsibilities to the IRS.25 As a result of this
delegated authority, the IRS prescribes rules and regulations for the
administration of the Code, interprets Code provisions, and clarifies the
Code’s applicability to various situations.26
Under the Code, art is a capital asset.27 A capital asset generates taxable
income when the asset is sold or otherwise disposed of at a profit,28 subject
to some exceptions.29 A taxpayer realizes a capital gain when the taxpayer’s
adjusted basis in the asset (the amount that the taxpayer pays for the asset
less any depreciation deductions or plus any capital expenditures) is less than
the amount realized when the taxpayer sells or disposes of the asset.30
The taxpayer’s holding period of the asset affects the rate at which the gain
is taxed.31 A taxpayer must hold an asset for more than one year to benefit
from a preferential long-term capital gains tax rate.32 That long-term capital
gains rate hinges on the taxpayer’s ordinary income tax bracket.33 For
collectibles such as art, the maximum capital gains tax rate is 28 percent.34

23. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (amended
2017); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3 (amended 1986); Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, ch. 2, 53 Stat. 1 (amended 1954).
24. I.R.C. § 7801(a)(1) (2018).
25. Id. § 7803.
26. Id.
27. See id. § 1221; see also Capital Gains and Losses—10 Helpful Facts to Know,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/capital-gains-andlosses-10-helpful-facts-to-know-0 [https://perma.cc/7GAX-QUXS]; Topic No. 409 Capital
Gains and Losses, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409 [https://
perma.cc/VQ8P-F7LJ] (last updated Jan. 3, 2020).
28. See I.R.C. § 63; see also Merchs.’ Loan & Tr. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 516
(1921) (holding that taxation on gains acquired from the sale or disposition of property is
constitutional).
29. Publication 544 (2018), Sales and Other Dispositions of Assets, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/publications/p544 [https://perma.cc/2G55-P3DQ] (last updated
Dec. 19, 2019) (describing the difference between ordinary and capital gain or loss).
30. See I.R.C. § 1001.
31. See id. § 1223.
32. See id. §§ 1222–1223.
33. See Topic No. 409 Capital Gains and Losses, supra note 27.
34. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(4); see also Topic No. 409 Capital Gains and Losses, supra note 27.
At least one legislative attempt has been made to synchronize capital gains tax rates for art
and other investment property. See Art and Collectibles Capital Gains Tax Treatment Parity
Act, S. 374, 110th Cong. (2007).
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In some cases in which a taxpayer’s income exceeds a threshold amount, an
additional 3.8 percent investment tax also applies to the capital gain.35
These preferential capital gains tax rates are a subject of debate as the 2020
presidential election approaches.36 Those who favor preferential rates may
emphasize: (1) the distinction between nonrecurring capital gains and
recurring income, such as that from wages and salaries; (2) the fact that
preferential capital gains tax rates encourage market transactions, thereby
remediating a lock-in effect of taxpayer retention of assets to avoid the
otherwise greater tax implications of generating taxable income at ordinary
rates; and (3) the various benefits of waiting until a capital gain is realized,
such as increased administrative efficiency and taxpayer accessibility to
liquid assets to pay the tax.37 Those disfavoring preferential capital gains tax
treatment may emphasize that: (1) a gain is a gain regardless of its form; (2)
preferential rates increase vertical inequity because those with more income
are more likely to have capital assets; and (3) preferential rates complicate
the Code’s administration.38
Though art remains a capital asset regardless of taxpayer classification, art
is taxed differently according to the type of taxpayer.39 Corporations cannot
benefit from preferential capital gains tax rates.40 Corporate capital gains are
instead treated as ordinary income and taxed at a flat rate of 21 percent.41
Further, 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations, which include many public art
museums, do not pay capital gains taxes.42 As a result, individual income
taxes are most relevant to the issues discussed in this Note.
2. History of the Income Tax and the Sixteenth Amendment
Federal income taxes raise revenue to fund government programs.43
Congress’s decision to tax a source of income or to grant a deduction or
exclusion therefore reflects a policy choice about which sources of income
should be targeted to achieve this goal.44 In response to these policies,
35. See I.R.C. § 1411; see also Questions and Answers on the Net Investment Income Tax,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/questions-and-answers-on-thenet-investment-income-tax [https://perma.cc/7CPK-STG3] (last updated July 22, 2019).
36. Bruce Brumberg, Capital Gains Tax Tug-of-War: Democratic Presidential
Candidates, Trump’s Indexing, and IRS Forms, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucebrumberg/2019/08/12/capital-gains-tax-tug-of-wardemocratic-presidential-candidates-trumps-indexing-and-irs-forms [https://perma.cc/P32HASG4].
37. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 566–70; see also Noël B. Cunningham &
Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 344–70
(1993).
38. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 570–72; see also Ed Dolan, The Case Against
the Capital Gains Tax Break, MEDIUM (Aug. 1, 2019), https://medium.com/swlh/the-caseagainst-the-capital-gains-tax-break-48e9c39ef9a8 [https://perma.cc/WR7E-LQEB].
39. Compare I.R.C. § 1, with I.R.C. § 11.
40. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 565.
41. See I.R.C. § 11.
42. See id. § 501(a).
43. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
44. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 537 (2012).
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however, taxpayers seek to design transactions to minimize their tax
burdens.45 A brief overview of case law reveals these competing interests
and demonstrates a steady expansion of Congress’s pool of taxable sources
to keep pace with the multitude of ways in which taxpayers generate
income.46
Though the Constitution originally laid out Congress’s general powers in
the realm of taxes, it did not offer contours to shape the tax system, such as
the substance and extent of permissible taxes.47 Article I, Section 8 grants
Congress the broad, undefined power to “lay and collect taxes.”48 Article I,
Section 9 prohibits “capitation, or [any] other direct tax . . . unless in
proportion to the Census or Enumeration.”49 Yet the Fifth Amendment
prohibits the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law,”50 and the Tenth Amendment reserves any “powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution” to the states or the people.51 The subtle
tensions between these clauses inevitably made their way into the courts.
Judicial interpretation of the phrase “direct tax” expanded over time to
encompass both personal property and real property. In one early case, the
U.S. Supreme Court took the position that, because direct taxes concerned
real property, a sixteen-dollar tax on carriages was not a direct tax to be
apportioned among the states.52 President Lincoln later expanded this
interpretation when he signed the first official income tax, which was
apportioned among the states by population, to finance the Civil War.53 The
tax was challenged, but ultimately upheld, in Springer v. United States,54
where the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that an income tax is not a direct
tax, such as a tax on real property, and therefore income taxes need not be
apportioned among the states.55 This holding, however, was short-lived.56
In Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,57 the Supreme Court reversed
course and held that income taxes did constitute taxes on property and, as
such, needed to be apportioned among the states.58 The limitations deriving

45. See, e.g., Arthur Acevedo, Abusive Tax Practices: The 100-Year Onslaught on the
Tax Code, 17 BARRY L. REV. 179, 184 (2012).
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173 (1796) (opinion of
Chase, J.).
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
49. Id. § 9. A direct tax is imposed on property, whether real or personal, “and presumed
to be borne by the person on whom it is assessed.” Direct Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 571–72 (holding that a direct
tax includes more than real property).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
51. Id. amend. X.
52. See Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174–75 (opinion of Chase, J.).
53. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 6.
54. 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
55. See id. at 593.
56. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
57. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
58. See id. at 618.
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from this holding likely motivated the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment
in 1913.59
The Sixteenth Amendment provides Congress with its modern taxing
power, enabling Congress to tax income “from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.”60 Throughout the twentieth century, the Sixteenth
Amendment granted various administrations the power to experiment with
different tax policies, reflecting the fluidity and continuous reassessment of
equity in the American tax system.61 As a consistent thread running
throughout this fluidity, the Sixteenth Amendment empowers Congress to
tax gains derived from sales of personal property, such as art.
3. Recent Changes: The 2017 Tax Act
The 2017 tax act reflects the most recent conception of how income, and
specifically capital gains, should be taxed.62 Its implementation marked the
largest set of revisions to the Code since 1986.63 In accordance with
promises made in his 2016 campaign, President Trump used the 2017 tax act
to reduce corporate and individual tax rates, increase various deductions and
credits, alter corporate taxation on income earned abroad, and double the
estate tax exemption, among other changes.64 The Joint Committee on
Taxation has estimated that these changes may generate a $1.5 trillion loss in
federal revenue.65
For the purposes of this Note, there are two especially relevant changes in
the 2017 tax act: (1) the elimination of section 1031’s like-kind exchanges
for personal property such as art and (2) the implementation of a similar tax
advantage for art investors through section 1400Z’s “Opportunity Zones.”66
Prior to the 2017 tax act, like-kind exchanges enabled an art investor67 to
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also Sheldon D. Pollack, Origins of the Modern
Income Tax, 1894–1913, 66 TAX LAW. 295, 296 (2013) (discussing a political blunder that
may have also contributed to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment); Benjamin G. Barokh,
Note, The Meaning of ‘Incomes’ in the Sixteenth Amendment, 15 GEO. J.L. & POL’Y 409, 411
(2017).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
61. See, e.g., Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §§ 311–314, 111 Stat.
788, 831–43 (reinstating the preferential capital gains tax rates); Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (amended 2017) (lowering the ordinary income tax rate
for the top bracket, increasing the ordinary income tax rate for the lowest bracket, and
eliminating preferential capital gains tax rates).
62. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 11.
63. Compare Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.), with Alan J. Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 589, 589 (1997) (discussing how the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 was the “most sweeping change in the U.S. federal income tax since it
became a tax that applied to most citizens during World War II”).
64. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 11.
65. Robert J. Barro & Jason Furman, Macroeconomic Effects of the 2017 Tax Reform,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2018, at 257, 261, 307.
66. Compare I.R.C. § 1031 (2018), with I.R.C. § 1400Z (2018).
67. The term “art investor” carries implications distinct from those associated with “art
collectors,” which will be discussed in Part II.A.
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defer paying capital gains tax for the exchange of similar works of art while
simultaneously adjusting the art investor’s basis in the work of art acquired
through the exchange.68 Art investors would benefit from this provision if
they received property “of a like kind to the property” transferred and both
parties had held the original property “for use in a trade or business or for
investment.”69 Legislative motivations for section 1031 included the
administrative difficulty of valuing assets in personal property exchanges and
the notion that in a like-kind exchange, a taxpayer alters the form but not the
substance of the investment and, as such, the taxpayer retains the bulk of his
or her economic position.70 No matter the legislative motivation, however,
this nonrecognition provision demonstrated the Code’s treatment of art as a
common form of tradable investment property.
Though the 2017 tax act eliminated the tax benefits for like-kind
exchanges of art, the act implemented Opportunity Zones, a program that
offers similar tax benefits to art investors alongside traditional investors.71
Opportunity Zones therefore continue to reflect the Code’s treatment of art
as tradable investment property despite changes in the 2017 tax act. State
governors designate, and the Department of the Treasury approves, lowincome census tract areas as Opportunity Zones for a period of ten years.72
Any area that satisfies the definition of “low-income community” under
section 45D(e) of the Code may be nominated.73 Alternatively, contiguous
areas that meet exacting criteria may be nominated.74 However, no more
than 25 percent of tracts of land in low-income communities can be
designated as Opportunity Zones.75 Once the Treasury approves a tract as an
Opportunity Zone, the “economically-distressed community” may “under
certain conditions . . . be eligible for preferential tax treatment.”76
The beneficial tax treatment occurs when art investors reinvest their capital
gains acquired from the sale of art into “Qualified Opportunity Funds,” which
are then utilized as “investment vehicles” to purportedly spur economic

68. Under the 2017 tax act, section 1031 of the Code now only applies to transactions
involving real property. See I.R.C. § 1031.
69. Bradley T. Borden, Reverse Like-Kind Exchanges: A Principled Approach, 20 VA.
TAX REV. 659, 661 (2001).
70. Id. at 665–67; see also Century Elec. Co. v. Comm’r, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir.
1951).
71. Despite the focus of this Note, any investor who generates capital gains may reinvest
those gains in Qualified Opportunity Funds. This is not limited to art investors.
72. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(b)(1); see also Opportunity Zones, ECON. INNOVATION GROUP,
https://eig.org/opportunityzones/about [https://perma.cc/2EJC-RZ63] (last updated July 22,
2019).
73. See I.R.C. § 45D(e); see also Rev. Proc. 2018-16, 2018-9 I.R.B. 383.
74. See Rev. Proc. 2018-16, 2018-9 I.R.B. 383.
75. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1.
76. Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions
[https://perma.cc/L79L-RQ7P] (last updated Oct. 22, 2019); see also Opportunity Zone
Resources, COMMUNITY DEV. FIN. INSTITUTIONS FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/Pages/
Opportunity-Zones.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZPC2-H432] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020) (providing
access to a map and list of all Opportunity Zones).
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growth in Opportunity Zones.77 Though individuals may participate in these
funds, the funds are organized as partnerships or corporations.78 For a
taxpayer to receive tax benefits through these funds, at least 90 percent of
fund assets must be invested in Qualified Opportunity Zone property.79 The
fund must be used to either create a new use for Opportunity Zone property
or to “substantially improve” existing Opportunity Zone property.80
Through these funds, art investors can defer, or in some cases nearly
eliminate, their capital gains taxes using one of two pathways.81 First,
investors may “defer tax on any prior gain until no later than December 21,
2026, so long as the gain is reinvested in a Qualified Opportunity Fund.”82
The tax deferral is worth a 10 percent exclusion of the deferred gain if the
investment is held for at least five years, or a 15 percent exclusion of the
deferred gain if the investment is held for more than seven years.83 Second,
if the investor holds the gain in the Opportunity Fund for at least ten years,
the investor may increase the basis of the investment “equal to the fair market
value of the investment on the date that it is sold.”84 This tax deferral grants
art investors a greater time value of money and enables them to reinvest the
amount of deferred tax elsewhere.
The Opportunity Zone program aims to improve economic conditions by
incentivizing private investment in public spaces.85 But it is estimated that
the program will generate an annual average tax revenue loss of $1.6 billion
over the next eight years.86
Despite the changing mechanisms for receiving preferential tax treatment,
this subpart has demonstrated that Congress has consistently aligned art with
traditional securities, both before and after the 2017 tax act. The ability of
art investors to benefit from this preferential treatment is not new, and to the
extent that the legislative history in the tax realm is revealing, this preferential
treatment is unlikely to be eliminated any time soon.
77. Joseph Bennett, Note, Lands of Opportunity: An Analysis of the Effectiveness and
Impact of Opportunity Zones in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 45 J. LEGIS. 253, 254
(2018); Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 76.
78. See Rev. Proc. 2018-16; see also I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(1).
79. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2.
80. “Substantial improve[ment]” is defined as improvements alone with a greater cost
than the cost basis of the property. See id.
81. See id.; see also Bennett, supra note 77, at 256.
82. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury, IRS Announce First Round of
Opportunity Zones Designations for 18 States (Apr. 9, 2018), https://
home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0341 [https://perma.cc/HM8F-XNPL].
83. Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 76.
84. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 82.
85. See Eileen Kinsella, Explaining ‘Opportunity Zones’: The Trump Administration’s
New Tax Break for Art Collectors, ARTNET NEWS (Jan. 14, 2019), https://news.artnet.com/artworld/trump-administration-tax-break-collectors-1436485 [https://perma.cc/ZH9A-GMEY]
(discussing how the 2017 tax act closed one tax loophole but opened another loophole for art
investors).
86. THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-67-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 6 (2017),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/ZA3DJU8X]; Bennett, supra note 77, at 258.
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B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Other Securities Law Terms
The second legislative regime relevant to this Note is the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.87 Through the Act, Congress created SEC, a federal
agency, to enforce the Act’s laws, all of which endeavor to enhance market
stability and protect investors.88 The Act is particularly concerned with
regulating corporate securities traded in the “public ‘secondary’ market.”89
As state law enforces corporate fiduciary duties, the Act is primarily
concerned with disclosures, reporting requirements, fraud, and insider
trading.90
Congress implemented the Act after the Great Depression to recapture
investor confidence in American financial markets.91 Its regulations impact
brokerage firms, transfer agents, clearing agents, and self-regulatory
organizations (such as the New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq, and the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority).92 The Act’s current scope and
statutory language indicate a legislative intent to protect transactions in
which individuals rely on external factors in the market for their own
economic growth.93
The SEC employs the test developed in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.94 to assess
whether an asset is properly classified as an investment contract and therefore
subject to the securities laws under the Act.95 In that case, the U.S. Supreme
Court looked to section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, which defined the
term “security” to include “commonly known documents traded for
speculation or investment,” and sought to resolve whether a land sales
contract fit this definition.96 Answering in the affirmative, the Court held
that the SEC regulates “contract[s], transaction[s], or scheme[s] whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”97 As SEC Chairman
Jay Clayton recently summarized, the test essentially asks, “Am I giving you
my money for you to go off in a venture where I’m relying on your efforts
and the efforts of your colleagues?”98 Part II.B discusses how this test might
apply to the secondary art market.
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018).
88. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 617 (5th ed. 2016); see also What We Do, supra note 20.
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b; see also ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 88.
90. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq.
91. See What We Do, supra note 88.
92. See id.
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b); see also S. REP. NO. 73-1455 (1934).
94. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 297.
97. Id. at 293.
98. Kate Rooney, SEC Chief Says Agency Won’t Change Securities Laws to Cater to
Cryptocurrencies, CNBC (June 11, 2018, 9:35 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/secchairman-clayton-says-agency-wont-change-definition-of-a-security.html
[https://perma.cc/MBC6-9ZBA] (including a video interview by Bob Pisani with Jay Clayton,
chairman of the SEC).
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Once the Howey test leads to the determination of an asset as an investment
contract, obligations under the Act attach to the practices surrounding that
investment contract, such as the fiduciary duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty
requires fiduciaries, such as directors and officers of a corporation, to
“exercise their authority in a good-faith attempt to advance corporate
purposes.”99 Part II.B also discusses how the duty of loyalty might develop
in the secondary art market if the Howey test applied to works of art.
An individual may breach his or her fiduciary duty of loyalty by trading
on the basis of inside information.100 Insider trading “refers generally to
buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship
of trust and confidence, on the basis of material, nonpublic information about
the security.”101 This vague definition, as well as the absence of clearly
defined elements of insider trading, has generated blurry applications for
quite some time.102 Recently, members of Congress have proposed a bill to
assist in interpretation.103 For now, however, insider trading claims are
brought under a statute concerning manipulative and deceptive devices.104
The SEC has also issued a regulation to implement this statute.105 Together,
these rules seek to eliminate fraudulent activities within securities markets
by requiring a corporate insider to “disclose to the public the material
nonpublic information in his [or her] possession relating to his [or her]
corporation’s securities, or refrain from trading based on the information”
when the insider has met a series of requirements.106 At this point in the
process, federal common law steps in to fill in the gaps.107
For example, Congress has left the definition of “insider” largely to the
federal courts. Though courts look to the Act and SEC rules to shape this
definition, neither text defines the word “insider.”108 Broadly speaking,
however, insiders are persons “under a duty of trust and confidence that
prohibits them from secretly using such information for their personal
advantage.”109 This duty has traditionally related directly to a publicly traded
corporation and its shareholders, but Part II.B discusses other potential
99. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 88, at 229.
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018); see also Insider Trading, INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/general-resources/glossary/insider-trading
[https://perma.cc/5GY2-L9CG] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
101. Insider Trading, supra note 100.
102. See, e.g., Thomas Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Insider Trading—a U.S. Perspective, Address at Jesus College, Cambridge University (Sept.
19, 1998), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm [https://
perma.cc/4A9A-AKDD].
103. See generally H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019).
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see also 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2019).
105. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
106. Laura Palk, Ignorance Is Bliss: Should Lack of Personal Benefit Knowledge Immunize
Insider Trading?, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 101, 105–06 (2016).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of Insider Trading 2.0, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS (2d ed. forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10) (on file with author).
109. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423.
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contours.110 Lastly, inside corporate information may be defined as
“material, nonpublic information,” either about a corporation and its
activities or about the larger market.111
Scholars debate the proper mechanisms to regulate insider trading.112
While some scholars advocate for the SEC to investigate potential violations,
others advocate for state prosecution.113 No matter the mechanism, however,
the proliferation of technology certainly assists the SEC and the Department
of Justice in monitoring insider trading.114 Using technology in a market
surveillance approach, regulators may track the timing of trades and stock
values to investigate insider trading.115 The SEC also sometimes relies on
tips and complaints from others to detect insider trading.116
This subpart has demonstrated that as trading markets grow, offering
financial benefits to investors, legislators have implemented regulation to
ensure equity and transparency in those trading markets. Though the current
application of those regulations is limited, its principles may properly apply
to other markets as well.
C. The Art Market
Defining art is tricky. As economist and auction house professional Doug
Woodham explained, “Unlike a hammer, a chocolate bar, or other objects of
daily living, art has no practical value. Its utter uselessness in performing a
productive activity is key to its inherent charm and purpose.”117 The IRS
took a broad approach to defining art through a revenue procedure,118 which
considered art to include “paintings, sculpture, watercolors, prints, drawings,
ceramics, antique furniture, decorative arts, textiles, carpets, silver, rare
manuscripts, historical memorabilia, and other similar objects.”119 As this
Note does not seek to provide a philosophical definition of art, no specific
definition of art (whether an expensive painting or a banana duct-taped to a

110. See, e.g., Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where Is the Line?, 2013 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 330, 335.
111. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997); see also Bainbridge, supra
note 108 (manuscript at 16).
112. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 108 (manuscript at 43).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Crimmins, supra note 110, at 335.
115. Elvis Picardo, How the SEC Tracks Insider Trading, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/021815/how-sec-tracks-insider-trading.asp
[https://perma.cc/WJ8F-TMHX].
116. Id.
117. WOODHAM, supra note 16, at 1.
118. A revenue procedure is an “official statement of a procedure” that is published and
“either affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the public under [the Code]
and related statutes, treaties, and regulations or, although not necessarily affecting the rights
and duties of the public, should be a matter of public knowledge.” Revenue Procedures,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/tax-exempt-bonds/revenue-procedures
[https://perma.cc/YUK7-V2T7] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
119. Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-3 I.R.B. 41.
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wall120) is as relevant to addressing the concerns of this Note as the means
through which the material is traded. In this sense, for the purpose of this
Note, art is defined as any visual form that is traded in a secondary market
for investment purposes. Though the issues examined in this Note become
more relevant in the context of significant art investments because of the
higher economic stakes, the issues may similarly apply to smaller-scale art
investments.
The art market refers to the economic venue for the exchange of works of
art.121 Initial sales of works of art take place in the primary art market, such
as at galleries.122 The secondary art market encompasses subsequent resales
of works of art, often at auction or in private sales.123 This Note is most
concerned with the secondary art market because it constitutes a trading
platform and can therefore be aligned with traditional securities markets.124
As mentioned above, the global art market has grown substantially in
recent years and the United States has retained the greatest market share.125
Multiple factors contribute to this continued growth. From a financial
perspective, these factors include popularizing strategies to incorporate art
into wealth management solutions,126 increasing public recognition of art as
a valuable asset class,127 and evolving perceptions about traditional financial
markets.128 The rise of “art finance” companies offering art as collateral,129
firms offering financial solutions for those interested in art investment

120. Caroline Elbaor, Buyers of Maurizio Cattelan’s $120,000 Banana Defend the Work
as ‘the Unicorn of the Art World,’ Comparing It to Warhol’s Soup Cans, ARTNET NEWS (Dec.
10, 2019), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/maurizio-cattelan-banana-collector-1728009
[https://perma.cc/7MG6-7TCD].
121. See WOODHAM, supra note 16, at 23.
122. Id. at 28.
123. Darius A. Spieth, Art Markets, OXFORD ART ONLINE, https://
www.oxfordartonline.com/page/art-markets [https://perma.cc/YP4Y-5XA9] (last visited Feb.
14, 2020).
124. See WOODHAM, supra note 16, at 31 (suggesting that auction houses are similar to the
New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq).
125. See Press Release, Art Basel, supra note 4.
126. See DELOITTE, ART & FINANCE REPORT 2017, at 98–107 (2017), https://
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/at/Documents/finance/art-and-finance-report2017.pdf, [https://perma.cc/7JTL-QBB5].
127. See What You Should Know About Art Investments and Trends, SOTHEBY’S (Mar. 13,
2018), https://www.sothebys.com/en/articles/what-you-should-know-about-art-investmentsand-trends [https://perma.cc/43J2-6TSD].
128. WOODHAM, supra note 16, at 24–25 (discussing how these factors likely contributed
to the growth of the art market).
129. Scott Reyburn, Art as Collateral in a Fickle Market, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/07/arts/international/art-money-and-collateral-in-a-weakmarket.html [https://perma.cc/6ZGY-27DZ].
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markets,130 and quantitative investment firms concentrating in art assets131
also exemplifies the growing nexus between art and finance. From an
industry perspective, the supply of and demand for an artist’s works in the
market, the trading behavior of other art investors,132 the prevalence of an
artist or genre in public discourse,133 and the publicity generated by museum
exhibitions and gallery shows also foster market growth.134 Despite this
market growth and the inclusion of art in investment portfolios, regulatory
oversight of the secondary art market has remained remarkably low.
Lastly, individuals can participate in the art market either as investors or
collectors. Traditionally, this distinction had profound tax implications, but
the 2017 tax act curbed the benefits of the investor classification.135 To be
considered an “art investor,” a taxpayer must engage in art transactions with
the purpose of producing income.136 Prior to the 2017 tax act, investor status
was preferential for taxpayers because it allowed taxpayers to take more
deductions for the expenses involved in trading art.137 Under current law,
however, many deductions are disallowed until January 1, 2026.138 In
contrast, an “art collector” (also known as a “hobbyist”) may occasionally
sell a work of art but his or her efforts are directed at building a personal
collection. Since the purpose of the collection is personal, expenses involved
in building the art collection are not deductible, though preferential capital
gains tax rates still apply when a gain is realized because each work of art
remains a capital asset.139
II. CRITIQUING THE CANVAS: EXPLORING THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF
INVESTMENT PROPERTY
Part I has provided the background information essential to understanding
the difference in treatment between the IRS and the SEC in approaching the
secondary art market. The tax system includes art investments in its array of
130. See, e.g., ATHENA ART FIN., https://www.athena-art.com/ [https://perma.cc/JU6JP4J4] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). Further strengthening this business model’s connection to
traditional securities, YieldStreet, “a digital wealth management platform,” purchased Athena
Art Finance in April 2019. See YieldStreet Acquires Athena Art Finance from the Carlyle
Group & Co-Investors, BUSINESSWIRE (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:55 AM), https://
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190410005300/en/YieldStreet-Acquires-Athena-ArtFinance-Carlyle-Group [https://perma.cc/95T7-SJT9].
131. See ARTHENA, https://arthena.com/ [https://perma.cc/Y296-DFBM] (last visited Feb.
14, 2020).
132. See Michael Findlay, The Value of Art: Money, Power, Beauty, ARTNET NEWS (Nov.
1, 2012), https://news.artnet.com/market/defining-the-value-of-art-27673 [https://perma.cc/
GP98-RNH6] (discussing the factors that contribute to the value of art).
133. See id.
134. For this reason, many art investors and collectors loan their works to museums as part
of exhibitions. See Paul Sullivan, A Museum’s Seal of Approval Can Add to Art’s Value, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/your-money/a-museums-sealof-approval-can-add-to-arts-value.html [https://perma.cc/2SSJ-YW98].
135. 26 C.F.R. § 1.212-1(c) (2019).
136. See id.
137. I.R.C. §§ 165(c)(2), 212 (2018).
138. Id. § 67(b), 67(g).
139. Id. § 262.
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taxable assets. The Act’s trading regulations, however, have yet to impact
the secondary art market.
Part II critiques the canvas that is the preferential tax treatment of art as
tradable investment property despite the absence of any modified securities
regulations of art. This critique is especially apt in the context of the growing
secondary art market in the United States.
A. Tax Implications of Art Investments
Preferential capital gains tax rates, the now-expired like-kind exchanges
for personal property, and Opportunity Zones each exemplify the Code’s
tradition of treating art as a tradable investment asset. The Code does not
draw a meaningful distinction between art and traditional securities as it
classifies both as capital assets and assesses the resulting taxes through the
same process.140 This Part dives deeper into the technical elements of how
that tax treatment works and posits why Congress may have taken this
position.
1. General Tax Treatment
As briefly mentioned, until the 2017 tax act, art investors could benefit not
only from preferential capital gains tax rates upon selling a work of art but
also from deducting the expenses involved in their trading endeavors under
section 212 of the Code and taking loss deductions under section 165.141 The
IRS, however, imposed strict requirements on the taxpayer before the
taxpayer could take advantage of art investor status and deduct these
expenses.142 These requirements likely derived from the fact that art is also
personal property and those who trade in art can also engage in personal
consumption in such a way that is not readily available when trading in
traditional securities.143
It is difficult to determine whether someone is an “art investor” for tax
purposes. The U.S. Court of Claims held in Wrightsman v. United States144
that a taxpayer must “establish that [his or her] investment purpose for
acquiring and holding works of art was ‘principal,’ or ‘of first importance,’”
to be considered an art investor.145 This involved a fact-intensive inquiry.146
The Wrightsmans did not satisfy this requirement despite the fact that they:
(1) often consulted art experts; (2) maintained investment card records in a
manner similar to those records in Mr. Wrightman’s oil and gas business; and

140. See, e.g., id. § 1221.
141. See id. §§ 165, 212; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.212-1(c).
142. See, e.g., Wrightsman v. United States, 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Stanley v.
Comm’r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 516 (1980).
143. See Christine Manolakas, The Taxation of Artists and the Acquirers of Art: The Many
Shades of Grey, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 69, 100 (2015).
144. 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
145. Id. at 1320 (quoting Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966)).
146. Id.
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(3) catalogued their works of art.147 Instead, the court held that the
Wrightsmans’ primary purpose in collecting art was “personal pleasure or
satisfaction.”148 The fact that a large part of the Wrightsmans’ collection was
kept on view in their personal residences in New York and Florida
contributed to this personal consumption.149 As a result, the Wrightsmans
could not deduct expenses involved in their art investing endeavors under
section 212.150 Later case law reinforced that a taxpayer’s primary motive
must be profit, and the evidence of personal satisfaction must be weak, for
the taxpayer to deduct expenses involved in trading art.151 One scholar has
diluted these concepts into fourteen factors that courts may consider before
classifying a taxpayer as an art investor, which illustrates the burden of
proving this status.152
The burden of proving art investor status has encouraged individuals to
develop other practices to acquire investor status and receive the
corresponding tax benefits. For example, free ports, offering tax-free storage
to art investors, have become a popular venue for art storage.153 When
individuals store art in free ports, they may avoid sales taxes and demonstrate
that their primary motive for investing in the work was not personal
satisfaction, as the works themselves do not hang on the walls of investors’
homes, but are instead locked in foreign vaults.154
Interestingly, Mr. Wrightsman was a skeptic about traditional investments
in the stock market.155 He admitted that a key motivation for the expansion
of his art collection was his opinion that art was “an excellent hedge against
inflation and devaluation of currencies” and an “appropriate asset[ ] for
investment of a substantial portion of his surplus cash being generated.”156
This perspective provides an early indication of how investors considered the
art market to accomplish similar goals as traditional securities markets. It
also suggests that some investors looked to the art market to supplement
traditional investments, thereby using both types of assets as part of a larger
investment strategy.
Under the 2017 tax act, art investors are treated more like art collectors.
Section 212 of the Code, which previously offered individuals an itemized
deduction for “all the ordinary and necessary expenses” for the production or
collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance
of property held for the production of income, is currently suspended as a
147. Id. at 1318–19.
148. Id. at 1322.
149. See id. at 1321–22.
150. See id.
151. See Stanley v. Comm’r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 516, 520 (1980).
152. See Manolakas, supra note 143, at 99.
153. See, e.g., Graham Bowley & Doreen Carvajal, One of the World’s Greatest Art
Collections Hides Behind This Fence, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/arts/design/one-of-the-worlds-greatest-art-collections-hidesbehind-this-fence.html [https://perma.cc/XR3X-7REM].
154. See id.
155. See Wrightsman, 428 F.2d at 1317.
156. Id. at 1318.
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miscellaneous itemized deduction under section 67(g).157 However, though
art investors are currently treated more like art collectors and are disallowed
a deduction for these expenses, both art investors and collectors can still
receive beneficial capital gains tax treatment. Furthermore, art investors may
deduct a loss for a transaction entered into for profit under section 165(c)(2),
but only if the loss results from casualty or theft.158
In allowing art collectors and investors to take advantage of preferential
capital gains tax rates after holding works of art for more than one year,
Congress implicitly acknowledges that the income generated from art
investments differs from traditional income sources, such as wages and
salaries.159 Rather, the income generated from art investments is more akin
to that generated from traditional investments in stocks and bonds. As
individuals look to structure transactions that minimize their tax burdens,
capital transactions are compelling. Currently, however, an additional factor
lingers to render art investments even more compelling than traditional
investments in securities: the absence of trading regulations in the secondary
art market.160
2. Special Provisions
Though the 2017 tax act extended the Code’s recognition of art as a
tradable investment asset, it shifted the focus from the investor classification
to the mechanism for receiving preferential tax treatment. There are three
main differences in how this treatment works.
First, only capital gains must be invested in Opportunity Zones, whereas
the entire value of the trade was considered under a like-kind exchange.161
Second, there is no investor exchange requirement to receive the tax benefit
under the new Opportunity Zone program.162 Entry-level art investors and
collectors who may not have other works of art to trade can still benefit from
this special tax provision. Third, and perhaps the largest difference in tax
treatment between like-kind exchanges and Opportunity Zones, is a new
mechanical requirement. Previously, under section 1031, art investors
themselves could defer their capital gains tax through like-kind exchanges.163
Now, under section 1400Z, a legal entity must be formed before an individual
can accrue the capital gains tax benefits.164
The transition from like-kind exchanges to Opportunity Zones carries four
principal implications. First, art investors may be less inclined to put works
157. I.R.C. §§ 67(g), 212 (2018).
158. See id. § 165(c)(2); see also id. § 67(b)(3).
159. Compare id. § 1221, with id. § 1.
160. See Lawrence M. Kaye & Howard N. Spiegler, The Art Market: Would More
Regulation Spoil All the Fun?, HERRICK (Oct. 2016), http://www.herrick.com/publications/
the-art-market-would-more-regulation-spoil-all-the-fun/ [https://perma.cc/6ZP9-UP3W].
161. Benjamin W. Kennedy, The Opportunity Zone Program, NEV. LAW., Sept. 2018, at
19, 19.
162. Id.
163. I.R.C. § 1031.
164. Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 76.
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of art in the market at all because they have no interest in Opportunity Zone
Funds and their ensuing technical requirements.165 This would reduce
taxable transactions and shrink the amount of taxes received through art.166
Second, some question the effectiveness of the presumed redistribution of
wealth and trickle-down economics in Opportunity Zones. Opportunity
Zones may not improve distressed communities because the policy fails to
include any grassroots elements of economic development.167 Further,
Opportunity Zone investors need not live, work, or have a business in any
particular Opportunity Zone to reap the tax benefits.168 As a result,
Opportunity Zones may benefit only investors, often for large-scale real
estate development projects.169 Third, the elimination of the like-kind
exchange tax break for art, but not real estate, is an arbitrary distinction. This
issue may become more pertinent if the Virtual Value Tax Fix Act of 2019,
which would provide capital gains tax breaks for like-kind exchanges of
virtual currency, becomes law.170 Fourth, Opportunity Zones redirect
investment opportunities from other places.171 This, in turn, clashes with free
market investment notions of public economic growth.172
Despite these concerns, Opportunity Zones are not an entirely new
concept, and some speak positively about the expected benefits. For
example, some scholars point to the fact that the Opportunity Zone program
generated benefits after Hurricane Katrina when Congress enacted the Gulf
Opportunity Zone Act of 2005.173 Further, as Treasury Secretary Steven
Mnuchin argued, “Attracting needed private investment into these lowincome communities will lead to their economic revitalization, and ensure
economic growth is experienced throughout the nation.”174
Whether one rejects or supports the concept of Opportunity Zones, the
novelty and complexity of the federal program has created confusion.175 For

165. CITI PRIVATE BANK, STATE OF THE ART MARKET 7 (2019), https://
www.privatebank.citibank.com/pdf/State-of-the-Art-Market-Spring-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T6XB-WW5N].
166. Id.
167. Paul Krugman, Opinion, The Great Tax Break Heist, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/02/opinion/trump-tax-opportunity-zones.html
[https://perma.cc/PUN9-MUZ6].
168. Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 76.
169. Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor Communities
Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html [https://perma.cc/4TZG-8A6X].
170. See H.R. 3963, 116th Cong. (2019).
171. Bennett, supra note 77, at 257.
172. Id.
173. Brandon N. Mourges & Michael J. March, Opportunity Zones: The Good, the Bad,
and the Yet to Be Defined, ROSENBERG MARTIN GREENBERG LLP (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.rosenbergmartin-tax.com/news/opportunity-zones-the-good-the-bad-and-theyet-to-be-defined/ [https://perma.cc/5PCN-BP7W].
174. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 82.
175. Howard Gleckman, Opportunity Zones May Someday Help Poor Communities. They
Already Are a Tax-Shelter for High-Income Investors, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2019/09/05/opportunity-zones-may-
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example, the process of investing in Opportunity Zones is technical and may
strike the average art investor as unclear.176 Further, implementation of the
program is messy, likely in part because of the rushed manner in which the
2017 tax act was pushed through Congress.177 Ultimately, it is difficult to
measure the success of the program at this early stage, in terms of both
investor participation and public economic growth.178 Nevertheless, the
mere establishment of the program continues to align art investments closely
with traditional investments in securities.
B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Insider Trading
As the Act and its insider trading regulations do not currently apply to art
investments, this Note cannot discuss the treatment of art or the regulation of
the secondary art market under the Act. However, this Note will analyze
elements of the Act, particularly its sections concerning insider trading,
which may provide an effective and proactive approach to reconciling the
Act with the Code and regulating the secondary art market.
Part I.B.1 discussed the basic concepts implicated in insider trading, which
are not clearly delineated in the law. The law only provides two broad
provisions to prosecute insider trading: 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (also known as
section 10(b) of the Act and criminally enforced by the Department of
Justice) and SEC Rule 10b-5 (civilly enforced by the SEC).179 These rules
seek to prevent the use of manipulative and deceptive devices in securities
markets. The jump from manipulative and deceptive devices to insider
trading seems unnatural given the fact that those who engage in insider
trading are not necessarily seeking to manipulate or deceive another
individual. This serves as just one example of how insider trading doctrine
has become a “doctrinal mess.”180
Some scholars posit that insider trading should not be regulated at all, in
part because it is difficult to prove the direct harms of insider trading.181
Other scholars may even support insider trading, arguing that if securities
regulations prioritize efficiency, insider trading can only improve the
efficiency of stock prices.182 At its core, however, a central justification for
regulating insider trading is to protect the integrity of markets for the

someday-help-poor-communities-they-already-are-a-tax-shelter-for-high-income-investors/
[https://perma.cc/WFA9-NARZ].
176. John Pantekidis, Qualified Opportunity Zones: Proceed with Caution, FORBES (Apr.
16, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnpantekidis/2019/04/16/qualified-opportunityzones-qoz-caution [https://perma.cc/GVK9-47HU] (critiquing Qualified Opportunity Zones
for their potentially perverse impacts).
177. Bennett, supra note 77, at 268–70.
178. Eastman, supra note 21.
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2018); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019).
180. Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 935
(2014).
181. See id. at 946.
182. See id. at 946–47; see also Bainbridge, supra note 108.
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investing public.183 This is a long-held, nearly instinctive notion in American
jurisprudence.184 As early as 1909, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
director of a corporation committed fraud when he bought stock from a
shareholder knowing that the value of that stock was about to increase
Once Congress
significantly because of a favorable contract.185
implemented the Act, the case law has since revealed a long-term judicial
puzzle to determine where the lines should be drawn for insider trading.
1. Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5 provide the starting point for
insider trading law. Under section 10(b) of the Act, it is unlawful to use “any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention” of SEC
rules “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”186 Rule 10b5 added substance to this prohibition. The rule renders three actions unlawful
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”: (a) the
“employ[ment] [of] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud”; (b) the
making of any “untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading”; and (c) the
“engage[ment] in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”187 These prohibitions
illustrate intent to curb investor attempts to manipulate information for
personal benefit.
2. Initial Regulatory Approaches to Insider Trading: Cady, Roberts & Co.
In Cady, Roberts & Co.,188 the SEC initially interpreted the Act to impose
an “obligation” on individuals to disclose information or abstain from trading
when two criteria were satisfied: (1) “a relationship giving access, directly
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone” existed and (2) the
“inherent unfairness” resulting “where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”189
This broad approach to insider trading alludes to the SEC’s interest in
fairness and the SEC’s protection of equal access to material information as
its key approach to fairness.

183. James J. Park, Insider Trading and the Integrity of Mandatory Disclosure, 2018 WIS.
L. REV. 1133, 1134 (describing this justification and acknowledging the “reality that there will
always be significant disparities in the ability and willingness of investors to access and
analyze information”).
184. Although, and interestingly, many foreign jurisdictions do not share this view. See
Newkirk, supra note 102 (comparing U.S. insider trading laws to the European Community).
185. See id. See generally Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (2018).
187. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019).
188. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
189. Id. at 912.
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3. Equal Access Theory: SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
In response to Rule 10b-5 and the SEC’s ruling in Cady, Roberts & Co.,
the Second Circuit “initially took the aggressive position that any possession
of relevant, material, nonpublic information gives rise to a duty to disclose
or abstain from trading.”190 This position is articulated in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.,191 a case in which the Second Circuit held that those who
transacted in or placed calls on Texas Gulf Sulphur stock after being apprised
of a successful drilling discovery in Canada violated section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.192 The court emphasized Congress’s intent to protect “equal access
to the rewards of participation in securities transactions” for all investors and
held that the investing public should be subject to “identical market risks.”193
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. marks the judicial implementation of the equal
access theory, which holds that “all traders owe a duty to the market to
disclose or refrain from trading on nonpublic corporate information.”194 This
holding contains two important assessments. First, traders owe a duty to the
market at large, not to any one constituency, to disclose material, nonpublic
information or to abstain from trading on the basis of that information. The
imposition of this duty levels the playing field among investors by
prohibiting an economic advantage for those with privileged insider
positions. Second, the expected value of nonpublic information, or whether
that information is likely to impact an investor’s decisions, measures the
materiality of that information.
In the context of the secondary art market, the equal access theory may
apply to anyone trading art who acquires material, nonpublic information,
either about a museum, an artist, or even a work of art, because a duty is
owed to the art market at large to promote equal access to information.
4. Fiduciary Duty Theory: Chiarella v. United States and Dirks v. SEC
In Chiarella v. United States,195 the Supreme Court held that the equal
access theory imposed too broad of a duty in requiring anyone in possession
of material, nonpublic information to either disclose the information or to
abstain from trading.196 To rein in the scope of section 10(b), the Court held
that an individual violates section 10(b) only when that individual acquired
material, nonpublic information and had a fiduciary duty, arising from a
“relation of trust and confidence,” to the party without access to that
information.197

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 88, at 630.
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 852.
Id. at 851–52.
ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 88, at 640.
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
See id. at 223, 230.
Id. at 228.
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Dirks v. SEC,198 a case in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “a duty
to disclose only [arises] where the inside traders [breach] a pre-existing
fiduciary duty owed to the person with whom they traded,”199 advanced the
fiduciary duty theory developed in Chiarella. In Dirks, the Court also
clarified that an outsider to the inside information who nevertheless receives
a tip of such information may be a “constructive insider” if the outsider has
reason to believe that the tipper breached a fiduciary duty in giving the tip.200
Though the fiduciary duty theory may at first seem inapplicable to the
secondary art market because the secondary art market does not involve
fiduciaries in the traditional sense, this difference can be reconciled.201
Museum directors, for example, may be deemed to owe a duty to their
respective museums.202 Since museums have the implicit ability to affect
prices in the secondary art market, and museums are also affected by prices
in the art market, museum directors may in turn become pseudofiduciaries to
their institutions, among others.
5. Misappropriation Theory: United States v. O’Hagan
The misappropriation theory advanced in United States v. O’Hagan203
covers a different dynamic of insider trading by focusing on outsiders to a
corporation who acquire access to inside information.204 The theory
“premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who
entrusted him with access to confidential information.”205 Even though
O’Hagan, a partner at a law firm, did not owe a fiduciary duty to the issuer
of the security, a client of the firm with material, nonpublic information,
O’Hagan did owe a fiduciary duty to the other partners of the firm.206
O’Hagan breached that duty by engaging in a “self-serving use of a
principal’s information to purchase or sell securities.”207
As will be discussed further, the misappropriation theory may apply to the
secondary art market in the context of gallery or museum employees who
may learn inside information from a trading platform, such as an auction
house, and seek to make profits on the basis of that inside information.
The case law reflects the evolving distinction between strategic trading and
insider trading at any point in time.208 The SEC likely benefits from this
evolving distinction because it allows for continuous tweaking of the
elements required, which may deter some individuals from engaging in

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
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463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Bainbridge, supra note 108 (manuscript at 4).
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.A.
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
See generally id.
Id. at 652.
Id.
Id.
See supra Parts II.A.2–5.
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insider trading to begin with because of the unclear scope of the law.209 Most
relevant for this Note, however, are the elements that are common to the
different theories of insider trading and their potential applicability to new
asset classes. The most essential element is the lingering prohibition on
investor use of a deceptive device, such as inside information, to generate a
personal benefit—financial or otherwise.
C. How This Regulatory Discrepancy Affects Art Investors and Policy
Considerations
Part II.A described how federal tax laws treat art as a tradable investment
asset without any material distinction from other capital assets, such as
traditional securities. Part II.B analyzed the securities laws that apply to
traditional securities to protect the integrity of those markets. Since these
securities laws do not apply to the secondary art market, this subpart
highlights the effects of trading in that art market without comparable
restrictions.
First, auction houses are not required to disclose details about guarantees
or irrevocable bids on works of art at auction as are trading platforms that
deal with traditional securities.210 Individuals, however, may know more
details about a work of art because of their own social networks in the art
world or their special relationships with experts in the field. These
individuals may even pay a premium for information precisely because it is
“tightly” held in the art market.211 Current circumstances in the secondary
art market foster the monetization of a competitive advantage of inside
information.212 As a consequence, individuals who cannot access this
information may suffer the effects of price manipulation in the secondary art
market.213
Second, buyer and seller identities are often unknown in art
transactions.214 While information about a work of art’s provenance may be
available, that information may also be incomplete. Indeed, museums
sometimes make active use of incomplete information in designing placards
that describe the work of art.215 This increases the possibility that an
individual may invest in a looted or stolen work of art,216 which poses a

209. Kim, supra note 180, at 933.
210. See Kaye & Spiegler, supra note 160.
211. See id.
212. Doug Woodham, Why Investing in Fine Art Is Different Than Investing in Traditional
Asset Classes, ARTSY (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-investingfine-art-investing-traditional-asset-classes [https://perma.cc/P6AN-XATQ] (discussing how
“trading on non-public information is an important driver of returns” in the art market).
213. See Isaac Kaplan, Should the Art Market Be More Heavily Regulated?, ARTSY (May
23,
2016),
https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-should-the-art-market-be-moreheavily-regulated [https://perma.cc/3TH9-AKR5].
214. See Kaye & Spiegler, supra note 160.
215. See Anne Higonnet, Afterword: The Social Life of Provenance, in PROVENANCE: AN
ALTERNATE HISTORY OF ART 195, 195–97 (Gail Feigenbaum & Inge Reist eds., 2013).
216. See Kaye & Spiegler, supra note 160.
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serious problem in the art market.217 Art investors rely almost entirely on
the “due diligence of the dealer,” whether at a gallery or an auction house,
for information without any regulatory requirements to ensure completeness
or accuracy.218
Third, and most broadly, individual art investors can make use of any
inside information they may acquire for personal financial gain or benefit.
Investors may receive this acquired information on an uneven playing field,
either as insiders themselves or with insiders selectively sharing information
with them. This effectively silos the art market into uneven networks of
information, which is becoming particularly problematic at the museumdirector level.219
The central problem apparent in each of these examples is a lack of
transparency in the art market that causes inequities and inefficiencies. This
problem, ironically paired with beneficial tax treatment, is not merely ripe
for comparison and legal analysis. At its core, this problem cripples the
public’s confidence in investing in the secondary art market and heightens
the barriers to entry. As the SEC becomes more aggressive in prosecuting
insider trading,220 and courts demonstrate an expansive approach to
interpreting the relevant insider trading law,221 the SEC should more
aggressively apply securities laws to the growing secondary art market.
Insider trading concerns cannot be remediated without a broader
understanding of the impact of insider trading on various markets.
D. Important Disclaimers
Before presenting a resolution to this problem, two important disclaimers
must be made. First, the IRS and the SEC have different goals. The IRS is
incentivized to maximize revenues through taxes and expand its sources of
taxable income wherever reasonable.222 The SEC, in contrast, seeks to
protect investors in securities markets and strategically targets its
enforcement efforts accordingly.223 These different goals require different
approaches, and presuming that these agencies should take identical
approaches to these assets would oversimplify this argument. The
differences between these agencies, however, do not eradicate the relevance
of synchronizing the approach to and treatment of an asset when it makes
sense to achieve the agencies’ shared goals of equity, efficiency, and
transparency.
Second, this Note does not advance the idea that art is synonymous with a
stock or a bond. Of course, there are differences in the process through which
217. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004); see also Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 130 Stat. 1524 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note (2018)).
218. Kaye & Spiegler, supra note 160.
219. See Massing, supra note 19.
220. See generally Crimmins, supra note 110.
221. See, e.g., United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019).
222. See supra Part I.A.2.
223. See supra Part I.B.1.
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each type of asset is exchanged and in the qualities of the assets themselves.
In terms of process, art is not a perfect fit for the Howey test.224 Art only fits
three of the test’s four elements: individuals (1) invest money, (2) expect to
earn profits, and (3) rely on external efforts (such as those by museums,
galleries, and auction houses) to earn those profits. Contrary to traditional
securities markets, however, the money invested in the art market is not
invested into a “common enterprise,” which constitutes the fourth element of
the Howey test.225 There is no single exchange in the art market. Though
there is also no single place of exchange for traditional securities, exchanges
in the art market occur in a more diffused manner. Further, absent an
arrangement between an art investor and an art dealer or consultant of some
sort, no individual or entity owes the owner of a work of art a fiduciary duty
for future behavior. As a result of these differences between art and
traditional securities, art may be less liquid than traditional securities
markets,226 and it may carry greater inefficiencies than traditional securities
markets.227
The art market also differs from traditional securities markets in the
substance of and information about the transacted assets. For example, no
two individuals typically own the same work of art in the way that two
individuals may own an identical share of stock in a corporation. Artists do
not usually mass produce the same work as a “fungible commodit[y].”228
Further, there are no price indexes assessing risks and returns in the art
market or audited financials providing information about the value of works
of art.229 The art market instead relies heavily on, for example, auction sales
at the nation’s two largest auction houses, Christie’s and Sotheby’s, which
function as a “duopoly” in the market.230 Museums may complicate the
matter by keeping much of the market’s acquisition data in the dark through
private transactions.231 This is changing, however, with the growth of
resources such as the Artnet “Price Database.”232 Lastly, forgeries and fakes

224. See supra Part I.B.1.
225. See supra Part I.B.1.
226. Woodham, supra note 212.
227. Gregory Day, Explaining the Art Market’s Thefts, Frauds, and Forgeries (and Why
the Art Market Does Not Seem to Care), 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 457, 463–65 (2014)
(discussing the art industry’s refusal to provide answers to pertinent questions about the art
market).
228. Id. at 466.
229. Woodham, supra note 212.
230. See WOODHAM, supra note 16, at 31; see also Martin Gammon, The Often-Ignored
Problem with Buying Art as an Investment, ARTSY (June 24, 2019), https://
www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-often-ignored-problem-buying-art-investment
[https://perma.cc/9C6H-SEFX].
231. Gammon, supra note 230.
232. See Price Database, ARTNET, https://www.artnet.com/price-database/ [https://
perma.cc/KM3N-SMUB] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
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render the art market particularly susceptible to issues involving fraud and
restitution.233
Though these differences are not irreconcilable, they must be
acknowledged before proceeding with this Note’s resolution. It is because
of these differences that this Note proposes the application of modified
securities laws to the secondary art market, rather than the application of
securities laws as they presently affect traditional securities.
III. UNVEILING AN INTEGRATED RESOLUTION
This Part unveils an integrated resolution to synchronize the disparate
treatment of art under the Code and the Act. It proposes that regulatory
efforts should target investor motives and not mere asset classes. As such,
insider trading regulations should be modified and adapted to fit the
secondary art market. This Part also addresses possible pushback to this
resolution.
A. How to Synchronize Disparate Treatment
Despite the admitted differences between the secondary art market and
traditional securities markets, investors in both markets share a core interest
in generating financial gain. Art investors exchange works of art in the
secondary market to increase the value of their works, and the amount of
increased value hinges on external factors.234 Investors in both markets also
rely on information networks to achieve financial gain. In the context of
traditional securities markets, these are circumstances that have sparked
regulation.235 In the secondary art market, however, these circumstances
have yet to receive regulatory scrutiny. Consider the shared investor motives
and patterns in both markets, which in turn contour the dynamics of equity
and efficiency in each respective market. Efforts to reconcile the regulation
of the two markets are worthwhile.
To the extent art investors in a growing market reap the same benefits of
preferential capital gains tax rates and other tax deferral opportunities (such
as those provided through the investment of gains in Opportunity Zones) as
investors in traditional securities,236 consideration should be given to
broadening the scope of insider trading regulations to include the secondary
art market, albeit in modified form. The application of modified insider
233. Frederik Balfour, Billionaire’s Secrets on How to Make a Bundle in Art, BLOOMBERG
(May 7, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-05-07/top-collectors-revealthe-secrets-of-how-to-invest-in-art [https://perma.cc/YM3S-B2SN].
234. See supra Part I.C (discussing factors that contribute to the art market’s growth).
235. See supra Parts I.B, II.B (discussing activities in traditional securities markets that
warrant regulation).
236. As a capital asset, gains from the sale or disposition of art should continue to be taxed
at preferential capital gains rates. Under current law, art investors can no longer deduct their
expenses for the production or collection of income generated from art investments. Compare
I.R.C. § 212 (2018), with I.R.C. § 67(g) (2018). Whether or not these deductions should be
permitted after the current law disallowing the deduction sunsets in 2025 falls outside the
scope of this Note.
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trading regulations to the secondary art market would increase the equity and
fairness of trading within that market, thereby bolstering investor confidence
and lowering the barriers to entry.
If the SEC is not willing to expand its definition of securities to art in its
regular enforcement work,237 a new subdivision within the SEC’s purview
should be formed to tackle these issues. Creating a new division that broadly,
but perhaps imperfectly, fits within the scope of the SEC’s work is not a novel
concept. In June 2018, the SEC created a new advisory position to adapt the
SEC to “emerging digital asset technologies and innovations, including
Initial Coin Offerings and cryptocurrencies,” which are also not identical to
traditional securities.238 Taking a similar approach to the secondary art
market would demonstrate the SEC’s awareness of that market as the
substantial investment vehicle and trading market that it is today. As the
following paragraphs describe, modified insider trading regulations could
apply to the secondary art market in various forms.
First, a modified fiduciary duty theory can apply to museum, auction
house, and gallery directors and officers.239 Traditionally, the fiduciary
relationship arises between corporate directors and officers who have a
relationship of trust and confidence with the shareholders of the corporation
whose shares are traded.240 Though most directors and officers at museums,
auction houses, and galleries do not owe a fiduciary duty in the traditional
sense,241 these individuals can be deemed to have: (1) a pseudofiduciary
duty to their institutions or (2) an indirect relationship of trust and confidence
with their customers or other investors in the art market who rely on these
institutions to support the market.242 These relationships generate a need to
curb insiders in the secondary art market from trading or tipping on the basis
of material, nonpublic information acquired through their positions for
personal gain and at the expense of others in the market. As a result of this
potential deception, coupled with the absence of direct fiduciary relationships
at each of these institutions, a modified fiduciary duty theory can take root.
In this context, the word “fiduciary” encompasses the more diffused
relationships of trust and confidence that exist in the secondary art market.
Though this modified theory may evoke elements of the broader equal access
237. Initial SEC reluctance to envelop the art market would not be surprising. See Rooney,
supra note 98 (promoting a formalist definition of the SEC’s regulatory scope).
238. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names Valerie A. Szczepanik Senior
Advisor for Digital Assets and Innovation (June 4, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2018-102 [https://perma.cc/2JGX-RKCR].
239. See supra Part II.B.
240. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
241. Sotheby’s was publicly traded before BidFair USA took it private in 2019. See
Sotheby’s Announces Definitive Agreement to Be Acquired by Patrick Drahi, SOTHEBY’S
(June 17, 2019), https://www.sothebys.com/en/articles/sothebys-announces-definitiveagreement-to-be-acquired-by-patrick-drahi [https://perma.cc/4YJP-QSHV].
242. Further still, if an art museum receives public funding, there is a strong argument to
be made that its directors and curators have a relationship of trust and confidence with the
public to carry out civic nonprofit missions. See, e.g., Grants for Organizations, NAT’L
ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS, https://www.arts.gov/grants/apply-grant/grants-organizations
[https://perma.cc/4EFS-BKLJ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
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theory,243 there should be less concern for overbroad applications given the
uniquely diffused and unequal information networks in this market.
To provide an example of this modified theory at work, suppose a museum
director, D, learns that a particular artist, A, will soon be featured in an
exhibition at a prominent museum in New York City. The exhibition has the
potential to significantly increase the value of A’s work, and the museum has
not yet disclosed this exhibition to the public. Rather than disclose the
information to the public or abstain from trading on the basis of this
information, D proceeds to purchase works by A in the secondary market. D
also tips a friend and fellow art investor, F, and F also proceeds to buy a work
of art by A. After the exhibition, D and F sell their works by A at a much
higher price because the exhibition has increased the value of the works.
In using D’s insider position as a museum director for D’s own personal
benefit,244 D harmed the owners of other works by A whom he purchased
from before the exhibition became public knowledge.245 F similarly harmed
those owners. Together, D and F engaged in manipulation and deception by
relying on inside information and artificially affecting the market.246 If the
museum later seeks to purchase a work of art by A, perhaps because of the
success of the exhibition, then D’s manipulation directly affects the
institution of which he is a fiduciary as a director. Ultimately, these
hypothetical transactions contribute to the existing negative perception of the
secondary art market as a murky “network of undue influence.”247 Under
this Note’s proposed resolution, the SEC may prosecute D and F for
violations of modified securities laws.
Second, if an individual does not have a strong enough relationship to
justify the application of the modified fiduciary duty theory, the
misappropriation theory or Rule 10b5-2 can apply to prevent museum,
auction house, or gallery employees from improperly acquiring a personal
benefit through the use of inside information at art institutions. In other
words, even where an employee may not owe a duty to another individual,
an individual may still be prohibited from trading without disclosure when
engaged in a network of inside information at his or her institution. Under
the misappropriation theory, the fiduciary duty is owed to the source of the
information that an outsider acquires.248 This could apply in situations
where, for example, outside counsel learns inside information when working
for an auction house in preparation for a large sale. Further, under Rule 10b52, museum, auction house, or gallery employees may be liable for insider
243. See generally SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
244. D receives two benefits here. First, D receives a personal pecuniary gain from his
own trades. Second, D benefits by intending to benefit his friend. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 660 (1983) (delineating the contours of tipper-tippee liability).
245. D also could have benefitted by donating the works by A that D purchased to the
museum and taking a charitable contribution deduction. See I.R.C. § 170 (2018).
246. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
247. Francesca Gavin, The Only Way Is Ethics: The Art World’s “Networks of Undue
Influence,” ART NEWSPAPER (June 7, 2019), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/analysis/theonly-way-is-ethics [https://perma.cc/ZR52-8E93].
248. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
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trading if they have agreed to maintain inside information in confidence, yet
proceed to share that information with art investors in breach of that
confidence.249 Such agreements can often be found in the ethical guidelines
of these organizations.250
Aside from adapting elements of insider trading to the art market, scholars
and art market experts have proposed other solutions that could support this
Note’s proposed resolution to improve the murkiness of the secondary art
market. First, a more formal registry that tracks price histories of works of
art “both at auction and in private sales” could be implemented in the
secondary art market.251 Second, more efficient uses of financial technology
could be incorporated into the secondary art market to provide “access and
information to retail investors.”252 Together with modifying securities laws
and regulations to apply to the secondary art market, these solutions are also
effective mechanisms for supporting equity, efficiency, and transparency.
B. Addressing Potential Pushback
As this approach is likely to be met with some pushback, this section
responds to anticipated counterarguments.
First, and most broadly, some may argue that the fundamentally distinct
goals of the IRS and the SEC cannot be reconciled through a shared approach
to the secondary art market. This Note has acknowledged the differences
between the IRS and the SEC, and this resolution does not seek to import tax
principles into securities laws or vice versa. However, this Note points to the
shared purposes of the agencies, especially in promoting equity, efficiency,
and transparency. The IRS works to create an even playing field through a
progressive tax system,253 while the SEC works to do the same by protecting
investors from unfair and deceptive practices.254 With these shared purposes,
this resolution aims to tie up loose ends in the secondary art market and, in
doing so, better actualize the purpose of each legislative regime in its own
right.
Second, some may argue that insider trading regulations are problematic
because they do not “advance” any “important federal policy,” yet they are
incredibly costly.255 Though this argument may be valid, it does not justify
deregulating trading markets altogether. By working to protect the market
and regulate insider trading, more people will invest in the market. The more
249. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2019).
250. See Gavin, supra note 247 (discussing the codes of conduct at auction houses).
251. Spiegler, supra note 14 (quoting Ian Charles Stewart, a venture capitalist based in
London).
252. Brian L. Frye, New Art for the People: Art Funds & Financial Technology, 93 CHI.KENT L. REV. 113, 113–14 (2018).
253. See, e.g., Meredith R. Conway, Money, It’s a Crime. Share It Fairly, but Don’t Take
a Slice of My Pie!: The Legislative Case for the Progressive Income Tax, 39 J. LEGIS. 119,
125–29 (2013) (discussing the legislative rationales for the progressive tax system).
254. See, e.g., Our Goals, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/ourgoals [https://perma.cc/B5RF-CWCW] (last updated Oct. 16, 2018).
255. Professor Stephen Bainbridge has discussed these arguments at length. See
Bainbridge, supra note 108 (manuscript at 64–82).
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voluminous the investments in the markets, the greater the opportunities for
innovation and economic growth.
Third, some may say let caveat emptor reign, especially in the notoriously
convoluted art market. This principle of “buyer beware” was popular as a
corporate law concept in the nineteenth century.256 In the twenty-first
century, however, equity concerns should trump caveat emptor in situations
like these where a viable framework is readily available to remediate and
clarify an especially murky market.257
Fourth, art investors may criticize the practical implications of this
regulation and wonder where the lines of these regulations should be drawn.
Who is an “insider”: a director at a museum? A gallery owner? A customer?
An artist? As noted above, however, the fiduciary duty and misappropriation
theories provide helpful initial contours here.258 Further, the “material,
nonpublic information” in the context of the art market can be understood as
information that an entry-level art investor who conducts a reasonable
amount of research cannot access on his or her own, such as a museum’s fiveyear calendar or a gallery owner’s network of information about an artist’s
future plans.
Fifth, some may argue that the unregulated distribution of information in
the art market contributes to investors’ success in this asset class.259 Surely,
some investors’ success in traditional securities markets would also increase
in the absence of insider trading regulations. Increasing fairness in the art
market does not eradicate, or even significantly impair, individuals’
opportunities for financial gain for those who strategically buy and sell art
based on available public information about the works and the market.
Sixth, some may reverse the approach taken in this Note and recommend
that preferential tax treatment for art be eliminated in exchange for no
regulations of the art market. As this Note considered the recent growth of
the art market to be a similarly important factor spurring the need for
regulation, removing tax benefits (which would in turn generate greater lockin effects and disincentivize market transactions) is an underwhelming
solution to this problem.
Ultimately, this Note pushes the secondary art market into uncharted
territory. If this Note provokes thought and debate on the topic, it will have
served its purpose.
C. Increasing Attention to Taxation and the Art Market
In the debates surrounding the 2020 presidential election, discussions
about how to increase equity in the tax system have become more relevant,
particularly in the context of a growing budget deficit.260 The Congressional
256. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 88, at 617.
257. See, e.g., Day, supra note 227, at 459–60 (discussing market failures and suppressed
information in the art market).
258. See supra Part II.B.
259. See Balfour, supra note 233.
260. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 21; Stevens, supra note 21.
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Budget Office recently assessed that the federal budget deficit will average
$1.2 trillion between 2019 and 2029.261 The topics of equity, efficiency, and
transparency in trading markets, such as the art market where individuals
may also benefit from preferential capital gains tax treatment, are interesting
and pertinent angles of this greater discussion. Improving conditions in
markets that are traditionally thought to be reserved for wealthier investors
may benefit the larger economy at whole.
CONCLUSION
This Note has sought to expose the impact that the disparate treatment of
the same asset by two different federal agencies can have on a growing
trading and investment market. As the art market continues to grow,
modified SEC regulations regarding insider trading should envelop the art
market to make it more equitable, efficient, and transparent. Tax benefits
should also be paired with greater oversight of the trading market in which
those benefits are generated. Though art differs from traditional securities,
the similarities that art shares with traditional securities, as well as the
motives that art investors share with traditional investors, justify new
contours in art investment regulation. An investor motive–based inquiry is
central to assessing this need for increased regulation in the secondary art
market.
The SEC should either adapt to enforce these modified insider trading
regulations within its traditional structure or form a subdivision to
specifically address trading issues in the secondary art market. Without
cohesive treatment of art as an investment asset, issues of inequity remain,
hindering honest and fair transactions within the secondary art market and
deterring the entry of new investors.

261. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2019–2029, at 7
(2019),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-08/55551-CBO-outlook-update_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MA25-N9V7].

